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McGUIRE v. STATE
MORE ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY WIRE TAPPING
McGuire v. State'
Baltimore police officers, suspecting a bookmaker in Bal-
timore of conducting a bookmaking establishment, tapped
the telephone wires leading into the building. As a result
of the wiretap, the police officers overheard a conversation
between the defendant-appellant in Washington and the
bookmaker in Baltimore, whereby the defendant-appellant.
agreed to underwrite certain bets taken in Baltimore. The
defendant-appellant was charged with conspiracy to violate
the Maryland lottery laws, and was convicted in the trial
court as a result of the wiretapping evidence which was
admitted over his objection. The principal question on
appeal was whether the trial court erred in admitting the
evidence obtained by the interception of an interstate tele-
phone message? Held: affirmed.
This was the fifth case to reach the Maryland Court of
Appeals on the extremely controversial matter of the use
of wire tapping evidence in a criminal prosecution.' Each
of the previous cases had decided that there was nothing
in the common law or by statute to prevent the use of
such evidence.
At common law the rule was that the admissibility of
evidence was not affected by the illegality of the means in
which it was obtained.3 This rule has been followed and
adhered to by many of our courts and foremost legal
writers. For instance, Mr. Justice Stone said:
"A criminal prosecution is more than a game in
which the government may be checkmated and the
game lost merely because its officers have not played
according to rule."'4
Professor Wigmore, one of the foremost proponents of
the admissibility of all pertinent evidence regardless of how
1 92 A. 2d 582 (1952).2 Hitzelberger v. State, 174 Md. 152, 197 A. 605 (1938) ; Rowan v. State,
175 Md. 547, 3 A. 2d 753 (1939) ; Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A. 2d 706
(1942), cert. den., Neal v. Maryland, 316 U. S. 680 (1942) ; Bratburd v.
State, 88 A. 2d 446 (1952).
3 Baum v. State, 163 Md. 153, 161 A. 244 (1932) ; Heyward v. State, 161
Md. 685, 158 A. 897 (1932) ; Hitzelberger v. State, supra, n. 2.
' McGuire v. U. S., 273 U. S. 95, 99 (1927).
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it was obtained, while admitting that wire tapping is dirty
business, justifies it as necessary in the fighting of crime.5
The Federal courts departed from the common law rule
on the theory that evidence obtained by an unlawful search
and seizure was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.'
The Fourth Amendment states:
"The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; ... "
The Supreme Court, in Weeks v. United States, in revers-
ing a conviction based on an illegal search and seizure, said:
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the
courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the
exercise of their power and authority, under limitations
and restraints as to the exercise of such power and
authority, and to forever secure the people, their per-
sons, houses,.papers and effects against all unreasonable
searches and seizures under the guise of law."7
Also to be considered is the Fifth Amendment which states:
"No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself; . . ."I
The first case to reach the United States Supreme Court
involving the admissibility of wire tapping evidence directly
was Olmstead v. United States,9 where the court by a five
to four decision decided that wire tapping was not an unrea-
sonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
nor was it a violation of the Fifth Amendment since it did
not constitute forcing the witness to testify against himself.
Here, too, the court decided that if Congress wished to
protect the secrecy of telephone conversations by making
such evidence inadmissible in a Federal Court, it could
do so, but the court would not adopt such a rule by extend-
ing the Fourth Amendment.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented vigorously.
Justice Holmes said:
5 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940), Sec. 2184b, p. 50:
"Kicking a man in the stomach is 'dirty business', normally viewed.
But if a gunman assails you, and you know enough of the French art
of 'savatage' to kick him in the stomach and thus save your life, is that
'dirty business' for you?"
8 Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616 (1886) ; Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
7 Ibid, 391-2. Italics added.
I See also Md. Declaration of Rights, Articles 22, 26.
9277 U. S. 438 (1928).
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"We have to choose, and for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part."1
Subsequently the law of wire tapping evidence was
changed by the enactment of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934" which provided that:
"No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or
transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any inter-
state or foreign communication by wire or radio shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through
authorized channels of transmission or reception, to
any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attor-
ney,... or in response to a subpoena issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful
authority; and no person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication
to any person; ...
With the enactment of this statute, the Federal courts
held that wire tapping evidence was inadmissible in the
Federal courts. The Supreme Court first reached this result
in the two cases of Nardone v. United States.2 In the second
Nardone case they also held that any derivative evidence
obtained as a result of the initial wire tapping was inadmis-
sible. Both of these cases dealt with interceptions of inter-
state messages which the Communications Act expressly
forbids. Later the Court went one step further in extending
the rule to intrastate messages. 3
Since these cases, the wire tapping situations that have
reached the Supreme Court or have been settled in the
lower Federal courts, have generally been concerned with
whether it is wire tapping under the Federal Statute. The
courts, it seems, have begun to view the Statute quite
strictly in order to admit as much evidence as possible.
To make the evidence inadmissible, the interception must
be made without the consent of the sender of the message.
Where one of the parties to the conversation consents to a
third party listening, it is not a violation of the Communi-
"Ibid, 470 (dis. op.).
n 47 U. S. C. A., Sec. 605. Hereinafter referred to as "Section 605".
"302 U. S. 379 (1937) ; 308 U. S. 338 (1939).
"Weiss v. U. S., 308 U. S. 321 (1939).
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cations Act. 4 Where an officer listens to a party speaking
into a phone by use of a detectaphone, the Supreme Court
held there was no communication or interception under the
Communications Act. 5 Where individuals confessed when
confronted with a recorded intercepted telephone message
of their confederates, the Court held that such confessions
were admissible because the Communications Act protects
only parties to the conversation.' Where an undercover
agent, wired for sound, induced a suspected criminal to
make incriminating statements in his shop which were
conveyed by sound wires to a radio receiver on the agent's
confederate on the outside, the Court held no violation of
the Communications Act, as there was no interference with
any system of communication within the Act.' Where
Federal marshals, while searching the premises, answered
telephones as they rang and received messages, the District
Court held there was no interception within the meaning
of Section 605.'1
Thus, we see that in the Federal courts the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 governs the situation. But
what of the State courts and especially our own Maryland
courts? The first Maryland case on the point was the
Hitzelberger case,'9 where the defense tried to exclude the
evidence on the theory that it was a violation of the Bouse
Act,2" which says that:
"No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be
deemed admissible where the same shall have been
procured by, through, or in consequence of any illegal
search or seizure or of any search and seizure pro-
hibited by the Declaration of Rights of this State; nor
shall any evidence in such cases be admissible if pro-
cured by, through br in consequence of a search and
seizure, the effect of the admission of which would be
to compel one to give evidence against himself in a
criminal case;..."I'
The Bouse Act applied solely to misdemeanors, but this
would seem to cover practically all wire tapping situations,
1" U. S. v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D. C., Dist. Col., 1950).
15 Goldman v. U. S., 316 U. S. 129 (1942).
' Goldstein v. U. S., 316 U. S. 114 (1942).17 On Lee v. U. S., 343 U. S. 747 (1952) ; reh. den., 73 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5,
U. S. ... (1952).
Billeci v. U. S., 184 F. 2d 394 (C. A., Dist. Col., 1950).
Supra, n. 2; see also casenote, Admi88ibility of Evidence Obtained by
Wire Tapping, 3 Md. L. Rev. 266 (1939).
10 Md. Code (1951), Article 35, Sec. 5.
See Note, Admi8ibility of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and
Seizure, 2 Md. L. Rev. 147 (1938).
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as wire tapping is generally done to secure evidence in
gambling or other vice operations which are misdemeanors.
Thus, if the Court had held that wire tapping was an illegal
search and seizure as the dissenters in Olmstead most cer-
tainly would have done, it would have excluded wire
tapping evidence to all intents and purposes from our
courts. The Maryland court, however, held as did the
Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States22 that wire
tapping was not an illegal search or seizure and as such the
Bouse Act was inapplicable because it said nothing of wire
tapping evidence inadmissibility.
The defense in the Hitzelberger case2" also contended
that admitting such evidence was a violation of the Federal
Communications Act which prohibited the interception of
telephone messages. This was the first, but definitely not
the last time such a contention was made. 4 The Maryland
court held that the Federal Communications Act was a bar
to evidence in the Federal courts only, and that Section 605
of the Act was inapplicable in the states.25 This view is
similar to that concerned with the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments which were held to have been adopted at states'
demand to protect the citizens from actions of the Federal
government, and thus it was established that these amend-
ments are limitations on Federal government solely.2" Nor
do the due process, and privileges and immunities clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the states from
acting. The Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee
against state action all that would be a violation of the first
eight amendments if done by the Federal Government.
Where some of the privileges and immunities guaranteed
by the Federal Bill of Rights have been incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment, it has been done so in the
belief that these privileges were so fundamntal as to be
necessary under our concept of ordered liberty." The case
21Supra, n. 9.
S2upra, n. 2.
Leon v. State, supra, n. 2; Bratburd v. State, 8upra, n. 2.
2 See McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D. C., Md., 1951), a case where
the Maryland plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendants from divulging
various intercepted messages in a Maryland criminal action. Judge Chesnut
said that Section 605 was passed in pursuance of power delegated to Con-
gress to regulate commerce and was not passed for the protection of equal
rights of citizens or others.
2Twining v. N. J., 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S.
131 (1887).
2 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937) ; Adamson v. California, 332
U. S. 46 (1947) ; Of. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
Ibid.
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of Wolf v. Colorado" went so far as to say that a search and
seizure, illegal because in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, is so abhorrent to our concept of ordered liberty as
to be enforceable against the States under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, were such action to
be affirmatively sanctioned by a State. The Supreme Court,
however, sustained a State court conviction in that case,
based on such illegally obtained evidence, because the
suppression of illegally obtained evidence is not an explicit
command of the Fourth Amendment, but merely a judi-
cially created rule of evidence, applicable in Federal prose-
cutions only. The Court said:
"When we find that in fact most of the English-
speaking world does not regard as vital to such protec-
tion (of the right of privacy) the exclusion of evidence
thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat this remedy
as an essential ingredient of the right.""°
However, there are those who believe that Section 605
of the Communications Act is applicable to the States.3'
Section 605 says in broad terms, "no person" and "any
person" which on its face could cover a witness in a state
court. It can be argued that if the effect of Section 605 is
merely to limit evidence in Federal courts, the protection
it gives against invasion of privacy would be limited, for
most criminal prosecutions occur in state courts and also,
many criminal offenses normally prosecuted in Federal
courts could by technical changes in the indictment be
prosecuted in state courts where the wire tapping evidence
would be admissible.
However, there has been an almost complete acceptance
of the view that the Federal Communications Act is inappli-
cable to the state courts.2 The Maryland court has adhered
to this view in each of the five cases to reach our Court of
Appeals.3 The Supreme Court of the United States has
directly passed on the question of the applicability of Sec.
605 in a state court in the very recent case of Schwartz v.
Texas.3 4 The Court agreed that Sec. 605 was merely a
w338 U. S. 25 (1949). See particularly the tables in the Appendix to
this case.
10 Ibid, 29. Parenthetical material added.
"Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 Cornell L. Q. 73 (1947);
Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 37 Ill. L. R. 99 (1942).
m Schwartz v. State, 246 S. W. 2d 174 (Tex. Cr. App., 1952), cert. granted,
343 U. S. 975 (1952), see infra, n. 34; People v. Channell, 107 Cal. App. 2d
192, 236 P. 2d 654 (1951).
U Supra, ns. 1, 2.
... U. S ... , 73 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232 (1952).
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federal rule of exclusion and was not binding upon the
states, affirming the lower court.35
In the McGuire case, 6 the defense contended that the
evidence was inadmissible because here the message inter-
cepted was of an interstate nature, while in the previous
Maryland cases the intercepted messages were intrastate.
This distinction, however, does not seem relevant as we
have initially said that the Federal Communications Act is
inapplicable in this state. Also, since the decision in Weiss
v. United States, there has been no distinction whatsoever
between interstate and intrastate telephone messages so
far as the Federal Communications Act is concerned. Judge
Henderson in the McGuire case says:
"Evidence obtained by wire tapping has been held
admissible in state prosecutions, not because the Fed-
eral Statute is limited to interstate communications,
but because it is 'presumed to be limited in effect to
the Federal jurisdiction and not to supersede a state's
exercise of its police power unless there be a clear
manifestation to the contrary'.""8
In Maryland, as in most states and in the Federal govern-
ment, there are various statutes making the molesting of
wires a misdemeanor . 9 However, there has never been a
criminal prosecution in this state for a violation of the
statutes. There are two cases on record in other jurisdic-
tions, but both failed because the facts did not put the situa-
tion within the particular local statute.4" Since the penal
laws to prevent wire tapping are so seldom invoked, the
evils attendant upon indiscriminate use of wire tapping can
be most practically met by prohibiting the use as evidence
of information thereby obtained.
A compromise approach on wire tapping today is to be
found in New York where, by constitutional amendment in
3 Lower court case cited, supra, n. 32.
MSupra, n. 1.
31 Supra, n. 13.
8 Supra, n. 1, 584.
Md. Code (1951), Article 27, Sec. 629, provides:
"Any person connected with any telegraph or telephone corporation,
company or individuals ... in any capacity, who shall willfully divulge
the contents or nature of the contents of any private communication
entrusted to him for transmission or delivery .... shall, . . . be adjudged
guilty of a misdemeanor ... "
See also Md. Code (1951), Art. 23, Secs. 297, 300.
40 State v. Behringer, 19 Ariz. 502, 172 P. 660 (1918) ; State v. Nordskog,
76 Wash. 472, 136 P. 694 (1913).
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1938, wire tapping was allowed with controls.4' That state's
Code of Criminal Procedure42 provides for the issuance of
ex parte orders by various judges, upon the oath or affirma-
tion of a district attorney, attorney general, or a police
officer above the rank of sergeant, of the need to intercept
telephone or telegraphic communications. There must be
reasonable ground to believe the evidence of crime may be
obtained thereby; the particular telephone line or other
means of communication must be identified, and the person
whose communications are to be intercepted must be de-
scribed. Through these means the indiscriminate use of
wire tapping with all its inherent dangers is limited. That
such dangers are to be found can be seen from the fact that
a United States Committee on Interstate Commerce recom-
mended an investigation of wire tapping because of its
dangerous propensities.4 3
A law similar to that of New York was considered by the
Maryland Legislative Council, as an outgrowth of a pro-
posal to ban wire-tapping completely. The Council recom-
mended to the 1953 Legislature a bill permitting wire-
tapping pursuant to Court order and permitting the intro-
duction of evidence thus obtained,4 but the bill failed
of adoption.
VALIDITY OF A REZONING ORDINANCE
IN MARYLAND
Kracke v. Weinberg'
A bill of complaint for a declaratory decree was filed
by the appellees, husband and wife, against the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore for the purpose of having a rezon-
ing ordinance 2 declared invalid as applied to the property
of the plaintiffs. The realty in question consisted of approxi-
mately 3 acres of unimproved land, traversed by streams
"N. Y. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 12:
"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable intercep-
tion of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated,
and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirma-
tion that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime
may be thus obtained, .... 9
2 Section 813a.
" Sen. Rep. No. 1304, 76th Congress, 3rd Session.
"Maryland Legislative Council, Report to The General Assembly of 1953,
Vol. 1, p. 32.
'79 A. 2d 387 (1951).
2 Ordinance No. 510, Approved July 10, 1946.
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